The Key Mechanisms of Competition between Hegemonic States and Rising Powers in the Era of Great Power Peace

　　Abstract: While the Post-Cold War strategic interaction between the U.S. and China differs greatly from previous interactions between hegemonic powers and rising states, the theoretical frameworks available for analyzing such interactions are not able to explain the underlying logic of competition between the two powers. These empirical differences and the related theoretical shortfall open the possibility for the introduction of new theories. This article considers how the means through which states obtain influence has changed in the period since 1945 during which war between Great Powers has become increasingly unlikely. On the basis of this discussion, it applies game theoretic analysis to the interaction between hegemonic powers and rising powers, and using the analogy of the behavioral norms of oligopolies from micro-economics, it proposes a dynamic model to explain interactions between hegemonic states and rising powers. The theory holds that in this period of “Great Power Peace,” the main challenge faced by a rising power is how to be successful in the competition to provide security guarantees to small states. The main difficulty faced by a rising China is not how to avoid war as it rises, but how to enhance China’s international influence in an international security guarantee “market” controlled by the United States.